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Kosmos
Astronomia Astrofizyka
Inne

Kultura
Sztuka dawna i współczesna, muzea i kolekcje

Metoda
Metodologia nauk, Matematyka, Filozofia, Miary i wagi, Pomiary

Materia
Substancje, reakcje, energia
Fizyka, chemia i inżynieria materiałowa

Człowiek
Antropologia kulturowa Socjologia Psychologia Zdrowie i medycyna

Wizje
Przewidywania Kosmologia Religie Ideologia Polityka

Ziemia
Geologia, geofizyka, geochemia, środowisko przyrodnicze

Życie
Biologia, biologia molekularna i genetyka

Cyberprzestrzeń
Technologia cyberprzestrzeni, cyberkultura, media i komunikacja

Działalność
Wiadomości | Gospodarka, biznes, zarządzanie, ekonomia

Technologie
Budownictwo, energetyka, transport, wytwarzanie, technologie informacyjne

# Judgment and Decision Making

• ## Spontaneous associations and label framing have similar effects in the public goods game --- Kimmo Eriksson --- Pontus Strimling

It is known that presentation of a meaningful label (e.g., "The Teamwork Game") can influence decisions in economic games. A common view is that such labels cue associations to preexisting mental models of situations, a process here called frame selection. In the absence of such cues, participants may still spontaneously associate a game with a preexisting frame. We used the public goods game to compare the effect of such spontaneous frame selection with the effect of label framing. Participants in a condition where the public goods game was labeled "The Teamwork Game" tended to contribute at the same level as participants who spontaneously associated the unlabeled game with teamwork, whereas those who did not associate the the unlabeled game with teamwork tended to make lower contributions. We conclude that neutrally described games may be subject to spontaneous frame selection effects comparable in size to the effects of label framing.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Taking the sting out of choice: Diversification of investments --- Judith Avrahami --- Yaakov Kareev --- Einav Hart

It is often the case that one can choose a mix of alternative options rather than have to select one option only. Such an opportunity to diversify may blunt the risk involved in all-or-none choice. Here we investigate repeated investment decisions in two-valued options that differ in their riskiness, looking for the effects of recent decisions and their outcomes on upcoming decisions. We compare these effects to those evident in all-or-none choice between the same risky options. The state of the world'', namely, the likelihood of the high versus the low outcomes of the options, is manipulated. We find that aggregate allocation diverges from uniformity (i.e., from 1/n), and is sensitive to outcome probabilities, with the pattern of results indicating reactivity to the outcome of the previous decision. Round-to-round dynamics reveal that the outcome of the previous decision has an effect on the subsequent decision, on top of inertia; the aspects of the outcome that influence the next decision indicate an effect of a missed opportunity, if there was one, in the previous decision. Importantly, recent outcomes have a similar effect in diversification decisions and in all-or-none choice.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## An interpretation of focal point responses as non-additive beliefs --- Aylit Tina Romm

This paper provides a novel interpretation of focal point responses (0, 50, 100 percent) in terms of ambiguous beliefs dynamics that arise in new developments of decision theory such as Choquet expected utility theory. In particular, focal point responses that have been updated from nonfocal responses can be interpreted as non-additive beliefs that account for psychological bias. A focal point response of 100 that has been updated from a nonfocal response can be represented by a non-additive belief that has been updated according to the Overestimating Update Rule. A focal point response of zero that has been updated from a nonfocal response can be represented by a non-additive belief that has been updated according to the Underestimating Update Rule. Focal point responses given consistently over time are not subject to psychological bias, and can be represented by additive probability distributions. Estimation results show such a model to be a very good fit to the data.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Multi-attribute utility models as cognitive search engines --- Pantelis P. Analytis --- Amit Kothiyal --- Konstantinos Katsikopoulos

In optimal stopping problems, decision makers are assumed to search randomly to learn the utility of alternatives; in contrast, in one-shot multi-attribute utility optimization, decision makers are assumed to have perfect knowledge of utilities. We point out that these two contexts represent the boundaries of a continuum, of which the middle remains uncharted: How should people search intelligently when they possess imperfect information about the alternatives? We assume that decision makers first estimate the utility of each available alternative and then search the alternatives in order of their estimated utility until expected benefits are outweighed by search costs. We considered three well-known models for estimating utility: (i) a linear multi-attribute model, (ii) equal weighting of attributes, and (iii) a single-attribute heuristic. We used 12 real-world decision problems, ranging from consumer choice to industrial experimentation, to measure the performance of the three models. The full model (i) performed best on average but its simplifications (ii and iii) also had regions of superior performance. We explain the results by analyzing the impact of the models' utility order and estimation error.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Numeric and graphic risk information processing of high and low numerates in the intuitive and deliberative decision modes: An eye-tracker study --- Carmen Keller --- Christina Kreuzmair --- Rebecca Leins-Hess --- Michael Siegrist

The influence of numeracy on information processing of two risk communication formats (percentage and pictograph) was examined using an eye tracker. A sample from the general population (N = 159) was used. In intuitive and deliberative decision conditions, the participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario presenting a test result. The participants indicated their feelings and their perceived risk, evoked by a 17\% risk level. In the intuitive decision condition, a significant correlation (r = .30) between numeracy and the order of information processing was found: the higher the numeracy, the earlier the processing of the percentage, and the lower the numeracy, the earlier the processing of the pictograph. This intuitive, initial focus on a format prevailed over the first half of the intuitive decision-making process. In the deliberative decision condition, the correlation between numeracy and order of information processing was not significant. In both decision conditions, high and low numerates processed pictograph and percentage formats with similar depths and derived similar meanings from them in terms of feelings and perceived risk. In both conditions numeracy had no effects on the degree of attention on the percentage or the pictograph (number of fixations on formats and transitions between them). The results suggest that pictographs attract low numerates' attention, and percentages attract high numerates' attention in the first, intuitive, phase of numeric information processing. Pictographs thus ensure low numerates' further elaboration on numeric risk information, which is an important precondition of risk understanding and decision making.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Public policy for thee, but not for me: Varying the grammatical person of public policy justifications influences their support --- James F. M. Cornwell --- David H. Krantz

Past research has shown that people consistently believe that others are more easily manipulated by external influences than they themselves are---a phenomenon called the third-person effect'' (Davison, 1983). The present research investigates whether support for public policies aimed at changing behavior using incentives and other decision nudges'' is affected by this bias. Across two studies, we phrased justification for public policy initiatives using either the second- or third-person plural. In Study 1, we found that support for policies is higher when their justification points to people in general rather than the general you'', and in Study 2 we found that this former phrasing also improves support compared to a no-justification control condition. Policy support is mediated by beliefs about the likelihood of success of the policies (as opposed to beliefs about the policies' unintended consequences), and, in the second-person condition, is inversely related to a sense of personal agency. These effects suggest that the third-person effect holds true for nudge-type and incentive-based public policies, with implications for their popular support.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Framing effect in evaluation of others' predictions --- Saiwing Yeung

This paper explored how frames influence people's evaluation of others' probabilistic predictions in light of the outcomes of binary events. Most probabilistic predictions (e.g., there is a 75\% chance that Denver will win the Super Bowl'') can be partitioned into two components: A qualitative component that describes the predicted outcome (Denver will win the Super Bowl''), and a quantitative component that represents the chance of the outcome occurring (75\% chance''). Various logically equivalent variations of a single prediction can be created through different combinations of these components and their logical or numerical complements (e.g., 25\% chance that Denver will lose the Super Bowl'', 75\% chance that Seattle will lose the Super Bowl''). Based on the outcome of the predicted event, these logically equivalent predictions can be categorized into two classes: Congruently framed predictions, in which the qualitative component matches the outcome, and incongruently framed predictions, in which it does not. Although the two classes of predictions are logically equivalent, we hypothesize that people would judge congruently framed predictions to be more accurate. The paper tested this hypothesis in seven experiments and found supporting evidence across a number of domains and experimental manipulations, and even when the congruently framed prediction was logically inferior. It also found that this effect held even for subjects who saw both congruently framed and incongruently framed versions of a prediction and judged the two to be logically equivalent.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments --- Ola Svenson --- Nichel Gonzalez --- Gabriella Eriksson

Svenson (2011) showed that choices of one of two alternative productivity increases to save production resources (e.g., man-months) were biased. Judgments of resource savings following a speed increase from a low production speed line were underestimated and following an increase of a high production speed line overestimated. The objective formula for computing savings includes differences between inverse speeds and this is intuitively very problematic for most people. The purpose of the present studies was to explore ways of ameliorating or eliminating the bias. Study 1 was a control study asking participants to increase the production speed of one production line to save the same amount of production resources (man-months) as was saved by a speed increase in a reference line. The increases judged to match the reference alternatives showed the same bias as in the earlier research on choices. In Study 2 the same task and problems were used as in Study 1, but the participants were asked first to judge the resource saving of the reference alternative in a pair of alternatives before they proceeded to the matching task. This weakened the average bias only slightly. In Study 3, the participants were asked to judge the resources saved from each of two successive increases of the same single production line (other than those of the matching task) before they continued to the matching problems. In this way a participant could realize that a second production speed increase from a higher speed (e.g., from 40 to 60 items /man-month) gives less resource savings than the same speed increase from a first lower speed (e.g., from 20 to 40 items/man-month. Following this, the judgments of the same problems as in the other studies improved and the bias decreased significantly but it did not disappear. To be able to make optimal decisions about productivity increases, people need information about the bias and/or reformulations of the problems.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## The letter versus the spirit of the law: A lay perspective on culpability --- Stephen M. Garcia --- Patricia Chen --- Matthew T. Gordon

\vspace{-1ex} The letter of the law is its literal meaning. Here, the spirit of the law is its perceived intention. We tested the hypothesis that violating the spirit of the law accounts for culpability above and beyond breaking the mere letter. We find that one can incur culpability even when the letter of the law is not technically broken. We examine this effect across various legal contexts and discuss the implications for future research directions.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Subjective integration of probabilistic information from experience and description --- Yaron Shlomi

I report a new judgment task designed to investigate the subjective weights allotted to experience and description when integrating information from the two sources. Subjects estimated the percentage of red balls in a bag containing red and blue balls based on two samples from the bag. They experienced one sample by observing a sequence of draws and received a description of the other sample in terms of summary statistics.
The results of two experiments show that judgments were more sensitive to the experienced sample compared to the described one for most subjects, although others showed the opposite bias. The bias toward experience varied as a function of the presentation order of the two samples in Experiment 1 and the presentation format of the description in Experiment 2.
The integration of description and experience exemplifies tasks that require integration of information obtained from different sources and in different formats. Informed by the findings reported in this study, I identify some directions for future research on human information integration.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## The price of gaining: maximization in decision-making, regret and life satisfaction --- Emilio Moyano-Díaz --- Agustín Martínez-Molina --- Fernando P. Ponce

Maximizers attempt to find the best solution in decision-making, while satisficers feel comfortable with a good enough solution. Recent results pointed out some critical aspects of this decision-making approach and some concerns about its measurement and dimensional structure. In addition to the analysis of these aspects, we tested the possible mediational role of regret in this psychological process. The Maximization Inventory (MI; satisficing, decision difficulty, and alternative search), regret, and Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) were translated and adapted to Spanish in order to answer these issues with a Chilean sample. Validity and reliability analysis of the MI reports that only two dimensions of the MI have enough dimensional support (decision difficulty, alternative search). The tested structural model shows good fit of partial mediation effect of regret between decision difficulty and SWLS. At the same time, alternative search has a positive relation with SWLS. These results suggest that Regret becomes crucial for prescribing behavior to decision makers.

2014/09/27 - 09:53
• ## Introducing upfront losses as well as gains decreases impatience in intertemporal choices with rewards --- Cheng-Ming Jiang --- Feng-Pei Hu --- Long-Fei Zhu

People tend to prefer smaller and sooner (SS) rewards over larger
and later (LL) ones even when the latter are much larger. Previous
research have identified several ways to enhance people's
patience. Adding to this literature, the current paper demonstrates
that introduction of upfront losses as well as gains to both SS and
LL rewards can decrease people's impatience. This effect is
incompatible with both the normative exponential and descriptive
hyperbolic discounting models, which agree on the additive
assumption and the independence assumption. We also exculde the
integration explanation which assumes subjects integrate upfront
money with final rewards and make a decision with bottom line at the
end. We consider several possible explanations, including the
salience hypothesis, which states that introducing upfront money
makes the money dimension more salient than not and thus increases
the attractiveness of LL options.

2014/07/30 - 02:00
• ## The evaluability bias in charitable giving: Saving administration costs or saving lives? --- Lucius Caviola --- Nadira Faulmüller --- Jim. A. C. Everett --- Julian Savulescu --- Guy Kahane

We describe the evaluability bias'': the
tendency to weight the importance of an attribute in proportion to its
ease of evaluation. We propose that the evaluability bias influences
decision making in the context of charitable giving: people tend to
have a strong preference for charities with low overhead ratios (lower
administrative expenses) but not for charities with high
cost-effectiveness (greater number of saved lives per dollar), because
the former attribute is easier to evaluate than the latter. In line
with this hypothesis, we report the results of four studies showing
that, when presented with a single charity, people are willing to
donate more to a charity with low overhead ratio, regardless of
cost-effectiveness. However, when people are presented with two
charities simultaneously---thereby enabling comparative
evaluation---they base their donation behavior on cost-effectiveness
(Study 1). This suggests that people primarily value cost-effectiveness
but manifest the evaluability bias in cases where they find it
difficult to evaluate. However, people seem also to value a low
overhead ratio for its own sake (Study 2). The evaluability bias effect
applies to charities of different domains (Study 3). We also show that
overhead ratio is easier to evaluate when its presentation format is a
ratio, suggesting an inherent reference point that allows meaningful
interpretation (Study 4).

2014/07/30 - 02:00
• ## Reasons for cooperation and defection in real-world social dilemmas --- Shahzeen Z. Attari --- David H. Krantz --- Elke U. Weber

Interventions to increase cooperation in social dilemmas depend on
understanding decision makers' motivations for cooperation or
defection. We examined these in five real-world social dilemmas:
situations where private interests are at odds with collective
ones. An online survey (N = 929) asked respondents whether or not
they cooperated in each social dilemma and then elicited both
open-ended reports of reasons for their choices and endorsements of
a provided list of reasons. The dilemmas chosen were ones that
permit individual action rather than voting or advocacy: (1)
conserving energy, (2) donating blood, (3) getting a flu
vaccination, (4) donating to National Public Radio (NPR), and (5)
buying green electricity. Self-reported cooperation is weakly but
positively correlated across these dilemmas. Cooperation in each
dilemma correlates fairly strongly with self-reported altruism and
with punitive attitudes toward defectors. Some strong
domain-specific behaviors and beliefs also correlate with
cooperation. The strongest example is frequency of listening to NPR,
which predicts donation. Socio-demographic variables relate only
weakly to cooperation. Respondents who self-report cooperation
usually cite social reasons (including reciprocity) for their
choice. Defectors often give self-interest reasons but there are
also some domain-specific reasons---some report that they are not
eligible to donate blood; some cannot buy green electricity because
they do not pay their own electric bills. Cooperators generally
report that several of the provided reasons match their actual
reasons fairly well, but most defectors endorse none or at most one
of the provided reasons for defection. In particular, defectors
often view cooperation as costly but do not endorse free riding as a
reason for defection. We tentatively conclude that cooperation in
these settings is based mostly on pro-social norms and defection on
a mixture of self-interest and the possibly motivated perception
that situational circumstances prevent cooperation in the given
situation.

2014/07/30 - 02:00
• ## Responsibility judgments of wins and losses in the 2013 chess championship --- Gro Hege Haraldsen Nordbye --- Karl Halvor Teigen

We report two studies on the perceived responsibility of opponents
competing for a goal that can be attained by only one of
them. Responsibility judgments were collected in seven samples of
lay people and experts before, during, and after the World Chess
Championship in 2013. Participants assessed the responsibility of
the two players, their supporting teams, local conditions, and
chance factors for four hypothetical outcomes (large and small
loss/win for each player), along with probabilities for these
outcomes, demonstrating subadditivity (sums exceeding 100%) in all
samples, even among chess experts. The winner was consistently
perceived to be more responsible than the loser, and more for
outcomes with large than small margins. There was also an effect of
focal player, as Carlsen was given more responsibility both for
losses and wins than Anand, by the present (Norwegian) pro-Carlsen
samples. However, this effect could be modified by describing the
outcomes as Anand's (rather than Carlsen's) wins and losses. Thus
the study adds to the valence framing literature by showing how
responsibility judgments are affected by the way outcomes are
framed.
% edits in abstract

2014/07/30 - 02:00
• ## Using metacognitive cues to infer others' thinking --- André Mata --- Tiago Almeida

Three studies tested whether people use cues about the
way other people think---for example, whether others respond fast
vs. slow---to infer what responses other people might give to
reasoning problems. People who solve reasoning problems using
deliberative thinking have better insight than intuitive
problem-solvers into the responses that other people might give to
the same problems. Presumably because deliberative responders think
of intuitive responses before they think of deliberative responses,
they are aware that others might respond intuitively, particularly
in circumstances that hinder deliberative thinking (e.g., fast
responding). Intuitive responders, on the other hand, are less aware
of alternative responses to theirs, so they infer that other people
respond as they do, regardless of the way others respond.

2014/07/30 - 02:00
• ## Are good reasoners more incest-friendly? Trait cognitive reflection predicts selective moralization in a sample of American adults --- Edward B. Royzman --- Justin F. Landy --- Geoffrey P. Goodwin

Two studies examined the relationship between individual differences in
cognitive reflection (CRT) and the tendency to accord genuinely moral
(non-conventional) status to a range of counter-normative acts --- that
is, to treat such acts as wrong regardless of existing social opinion
or norms. We contrasted social violations that are
intrinsically harmful to others (e.g., fraud, thievery) with
those that are not (e.g., wearing pajamas to work and engaging in
consensual acts of sexual intimacy with an adult sibling). Our key
hypothesis was that more reflective (higher CRT) individuals would tend
to moralize selectively --- treating only intrinsically harmful acts as
genuinely morally wrong --- whereas less reflective (lower CRT)
individuals would moralize more indiscriminately. We found clear
support for this hypothesis in a large and ideologically diverse sample
of American adults. The predicted associations were not fully accounted
for by the subjects' political orientation, sensitivity
to gut feelings, gender, age, educational attainment, or their
placement on a sexual morals-specific measure of social conservatism.
Our studies are the first to demonstrate that, in addition to
modulating the intensity of moral condemnation, reflection may also
play a key role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain as such.

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## Cynicism in negotiation: When communication increases buyers' skepticism --- Eyal Ert --- Stephanie Creary --- Max H. Bazerman

The economic literature on negotiation shows that strategic concerns
can be a barrier to agreement, even when the buyer values the good
more than the seller. Yet behavioral research demonstrates that
human interaction can overcome these strategic concerns through
communication. We show that there is also a downside of this human
interaction: cynicism. Across two studies we focus on a
about the goods for sale, but has a positive expected payoff from
saying yes'' to the available transaction. Study 1 shows that
rates drop significantly when offers are made by human sellers who
communicate directly with buyers. Study 2 clarifies that this
effect results from allowing human sellers to communicate with
attention on the seller's trustworthiness. The mere situation of
negotiated interaction increases buyers' attention to the sellers'
self-serving motives and, consequently, buyers' cynicism. Unaware
of this downside of interaction, sellers actually prefer to have the

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest --- Anna E. van 't Veer --- Mariëlle Stel

The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical
decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is
believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the
cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling
a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth,
we hypothesized that participants would be more honest under high
rolled a die three times and reported their outcomes --- of which one of
the rolls would be paid out --- while either under high or low cognitive
load. For the roll that determined pay, participants under low
that were significantly different from a uniform (honest) distribution.
The reported outcome of this roll was also significantly higher in the
participants in the low load condition lied to get higher pay. This
pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where
participants knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where
therefore lying would not serve self-interest. Results thus indicate
that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil a tendency to be
honest in a situation where having more cognitive capacity would have
enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## On the psychology of self-prediction: Consideration of situational barriers to intended actions --- Connie S. K. Poon --- Derek J. Koehler --- Roger Buehler

When people predict their future behavior, they tend to place too much
weight on their current intentions, which produces an optimistic bias
for behaviors associated with currently strong intentions. More
realistic self-predictions require greater sensitivity to situational
barriers, such as obstacles or competing demands, that may interfere
with the translation of current intentions into future behavior. We
consider three reasons why people may not adjust sufficiently for such
barriers. First, self-predictions may focus exclusively on current
intentions, ignoring potential barriers altogether. We test this
possibility, in three studies, with manipulations that draw greater
attention to barriers. Second, barriers may be discounted in the
self-prediction process. We test this possibility by comparing
prospective and retrospective ratings of the impact of barriers on the
target behavior. Neither possibility was supported in these tests, or
in a further test examining whether an optimally weighted statistical
model could improve on the accuracy of self-predictions by placing
greater weight on anticipated situational barriers. Instead, the
evidence supports a third possibility: Even when they acknowledge that
situational factors can affect the likelihood of carrying out an
intended behavior, people do not adequately moderate the weight placed
on their current intentions when predicting their future behavior.

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## The effects of mental steps and compatibility on Bayesian reasoning --- Shahar Ayal --- Ruth Beyth-Marom

Four laboratory studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that
correct Bayesian reasoning can be predicted by two factors of task
complexity --- the number of mental steps required to reach
the normative solution, and the compatibility between the
framing of data presented and the framing of the question posed. The
findings show that participants performed better on frequency format
questions only when one mental step was required to solve the task
and when the data were in a compatible frequency format. By
contrast, participants performed more poorly on more complicated
tasks which required more mental steps (in a compatible frequency or
probability format) or when the data and question formats were
incompatible (Studies 1 and 2). Incompatibility between data and
question formats was also associated with higher reaction times
(Study 2b). Furthermore, on problems that incorporated
incompatibility between the data sample size and the target
(question) sample size, participants performed better on the
probability question than the frequency question, regardless of data
format (Study 3). The latter findings highlight the ecological
advantage of translating data into probability terms, which are
normalized in a range between 0 and 1, and thus can be transferred
from one situation to another.

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## How many calories were in those hamburgers again? Distribution density biases recall of attribute values --- Jessica M. Choplin --- Douglas H. Wedell

Decisions that consumers make often rest on evaluations of attributes,
such as how large, expensive, good, or fattening an option seems.
Extant research has demonstrated that these evaluations in turn depend
upon the recently experienced distribution of attribute values (e.g.,
positively or negatively skewed). In many situations decisions rely on
recalling the attribute values of each option, a process that has been
neglected in much of the previous literature. In two experiments,
participants learned attribute information for labeled stimuli
presented within either a positively or negatively skewed distribution
and then they recalled values from labels after approximately one
minute. The results demonstrated effects that are inconsistent with
predictions of the category-adjustment model (Duffy, Huttenlocher,
Hedges & Crawford, 2010) that recalled values would shift toward the
mean of the distribution of values presented. Instead, results were
consistent with predictions of the comparison-induced distortion model
(Choplin & Hummel, 2002) that remembered values would depend on the
density of stimuli within the attribute range. Reasons for these results,
alternative models, and implications for decision-making are discussed.
% changed with to within

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## Using cognitive models to combine probability estimates --- Michael D. Lee

We demonstrate the usefulness of cognitive models for combining
human estimates of probabilities in two experiments. The first
experiment involves people's estimates of probabilities for general
knowledge questions such as What percentage of the world's
population speaks English as a first language?'' The second
experiment involves people's estimates of probabilities in football
(soccer) games, such as What is the probability a team leading
1--0 at half time will win the game?'', with ground truths based on
analysis of large corpus of games played in the past decade. In both
experiments, we collect people's probability estimates, and develop
a cognitive model of the estimation process, including assumptions
about the calibration of probabilities and individual
differences. We show that the cognitive model approach outperforms
standard statistical aggregation methods like the mean and the
median for both experiments and, unlike most previous related work,
is able to make good predictions in a fully unsupervised setting. We
also show that the parameters inferred as part of the cognitive
modeling, involving calibration and expertise, provide useful
measures of the cognitive characteristics of individuals. We argue
that the cognitive approach has the advantage of aggregating over
latent human knowledge rather than observed estimates, and emphasize
that it can be applied in predictive settings where answers are not
yet available.

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## The combined role of task, child's age and individual differences in understanding decision processes --- Irwin P. Levin --- Elaine A. Bossard --- Gary J. Gaeth --- Haoyang Yan

It is important to understand the impact of individual differences in
decision making from childhood to adulthood. This cohort-based study
extends our knowledge by comparing decision making of children across
the age range of 8 to 17 years and their parents. Based on prior
research and theory focusing on different types of framing effects, we
uncover several key differences across ages, including levels of risk
taking and sensitivity to expected value differences between risky and
riskless choices. Furthermore, we find that measures such as Numeracy
and Surgency help explain both age-related and individual differences
on our tasks, especially for decisions involving risk. We discuss the
role of diverse task measures in understanding how individual
difference factors affect different aspects of decision making,
including the ability and effort to process numerical information and
the ability to suppress affective reactions to stimulus labels.

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## Change and status quo in decisions with defaults: The effect of incidental emotions depends on the type of default --- Yury Shevchenko --- Bettina von Helversen --- Benjamin Scheibehenne

Affective states can change how people react to measures aimed at
influencing their decisions such as providing a default option.
Previous research has shown that when defaults maintain the status quo
positive mood increases reliance on the default and negative mood
decreases it. Similarly, it has been demonstrated that positive mood
enhances the preference for inaction. We extend this
research by investigating how mood states influence reliance on the
default if the default leads to a change, thus pitting preference for
status quo against a preference for inaction. Specifically, we tested
in an online study how happiness and sadness influenced reliance on two
types of default (1) a default maintaining status quo and (2) a default
inducing change. Our results suggest that the effect of emotions
depends on the type of default: people in a happy mood were more likely
than sad people to follow a default when it maintained status quo but
less likely to follow a default when it introduced change. These
results are in line with mood maintenance theory.

2014/05/28 - 06:28
• ## Outcomes and expectations in dilemmas of trust --- Anthony M. Evans --- Joachim I. Krueger

Rational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations
of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes and expectations correspond
to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments
investigated how risk and temptation influenced information search and
final decisions in the trust game. The central finding was that
trustors underemphasized temptation relative to its effects on the
egocentrically, focusing on potential outcomes. In Experiment 1,
information search data revealed that trustors often made decisions
without learning about the payoffs related to temptation. Experiment 2
investigated whether trustors were able to use temptation to form
accurate expectations of reciprocity. Trustors understood, but
underestimated, the relationship between temptation and the probability
of reciprocity. Moreover, they did not fully consider expectations in
their final trust decisions. Changes in potential outcomes had larger
effects on trust than comparable changes in expectations. These results
suggest that levels of trust are too high when the probability of
reciprocity is low and too low when that probability is high.

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## Interpersonal effects of expressed anger and sorrow in morally charged negotiation --- Morteza Dehghani --- Peter J. Carnevale --- Jonathan Gratch

The expression of emotion can play a significant role in strategic decision-making. In this study, we hypothesized that emotion expression alters behavior in morally charged negotiation. We investigated the impact of facial displays of discrete emotions, specifically anger and sadness, in a morally charged multi-issue negotiation task. Our results indicate that if a negotiator associated moral significance to the object of the negotiation, displays of anger resulted in reduced concession making whereas displays of sadness increased concession making. Moral significance of the issues fostered an emotional matching mechanism of sorrow, where a sorrow expression from one party elicited a sorrow expression from the other. Taken together, the results indicate that emotional expressions can affect morally charged negotiation in ways that can inhibit as well as promote cooperation.

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## A signal detection theory analysis of racial and ethnic disproportionality in the referral and substantiation processes of the U.S. child welfare services system --- Jeryl L. Mumpower --- Gary H. McClelland

Signal detection theory (SDT) was developed to analyze the behavior of a
single judge but also can be used to analyze decisions made by
organizations or other social systems. SDT quantifies the ability to
distinguish between signal and noise by separating accuracy of the
detection system from response bias - the propensity to over-warn (too
many false positives) or under-warn (too many misses). We apply SDT
techniques to national and state-level data sets to analyze the ability
of the child welfare services systems to detect instances of child
maltreatment. Blacks have higher rates of referral and the system is
less accurate for them than for Whites or Hispanics. The incidence of
false positives - referrals leading to unsubstantiated findings - is
higher for Blacks than for other groups, as is the incidence of false
negatives - children for whom no referral was made but who are in fact
neglected or abused. The rate of true positives - children for whom a
referral was made and for whom the allegation was substantiated - is
higher for Blacks. Values of d' (signal strength) are roughly the same
for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics but there are pronounced group
differences in C (a measure of the location of the decision
threshold). Analyses show that the child welfare services system treats
Blacks differently from Hispanics and Whites in ways that cannot be
justified readily in terms of objective measures of group differences.
This study illustrates the potential for JDM techniques such as SDT to
contribute to understanding of system-level decision making processes.

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## Approximating rationality under incomplete information: Adaptive inferences for missing cue values based on cue-discrimination --- Marc Jekel --- Andreas Glockner --- Arndt Broder --- Viktoriya Maydych

In a highly uncertain world, individuals often have to make decisions in situations with incomplete information. We investigated in three experiments how partial cue information is treated in complex probabilistic inference tasks. Specifically, we test a mechanism to infer missing cue values that is based on the discrimination rate of cues (i.e., how often a cue makes distinct predictions for choice options). We show analytically that inferring missing cue values based on discrimination rate maximizes the probability for a correct inference in many decision environments and that it is therefore adaptive to use it. Results from three experiments show that individuals are sensitive to the discrimination rate and use it when it is a valid inference mechanism but rely on other inference mechanisms, such as the cues' base-rate of positive information, when it is not. We find adaptive inferences for incomplete information in environments in which participants are explicitly provided with information concerning the base-rate and discrimination rate of cues (Exp. 1) as well as in environments in which they learn these properties by experience (Exp. 2). Results also hold in environments of further increased complexity (Exp. 3). In all studies, participants show a high ability to adaptively infer incomplete information and to integrate this inferred information with other available cues to approximate the naive Bayesian solution.

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## Cognitive reflection test and behavioral biases in Malaysia --- Mohamed Albaity --- Mahfuzur Rahman --- Islam Shahidul

We asked whether behavioral biases are related to cognitive
abilities of Malaysian youth. Frederick's three-item Cognitive
Reflection Test was used to understand the role of behavioral biases
concerning behavioral economics and finance. The sample (n = 880)
comprised of university students from different parts of
Malaysia. We found significant CRT differences as a function of
gender, race and age groups. In addition, lower scores on the CRT
are correlated positively with time preference and conservatism, but
not with risk preference or the conjunction fallacy.

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## Subjective but not objective numeracy influences willingness to pay for BRCA1/2 genetic testing --- Talya Miron-Shatz --- Yaniv Hanoch --- Glen M. Doniger --- Zehra B. Omer --- Elissa M. Ozanne

A positive test result for BRCA1/2 gene mutation is a substantial
risk factor for breast and ovarian cancer. However, testing is not
always covered by insurance, even for high risk women. Variables
affecting willingness to pay (WTP) have implications for
clinic-based and direct-to-consumer testing. The relative impact of
objective and subjective numeracy on WTP, in the context of worry,
perceived risk (of having the mutation and developing breast cancer)
and family history, was examined in 299 high-risk women, not
previously tested for BRCA1/2. Objective and subjective numeracy
correlated positively with one another, yet only subjective numeracy
correlated (positively) with WTP. This could not be explained by
educational level or worry. In line with the numeracy result, other
objective factors including family history, age, and Ashkenazi
descent were not correlated with WTP. Perceived risk of having a
mutation was also correlated with WTP, though perceived risk of
developing breast cancer was not, perhaps because it lacks direct
connection with testing. Thus, subjective confidence in the ability
to interpret test results and perceived risk of a positive test
result are more important drivers in paying for BRCA1/2 testing than
factors more objective and/or further removed from the testing
itself (e.g., perceived risk of developing cancer, family
history). Findings underscore the need for genetic counselling that
makes probabilistic information accessible and intelligible, so as
to build confidence and promote accurate perception of mutation risk
and ultimately better decision-making.

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## Good luck, bad luck, and ambiguity aversion --- Briony D. Pulford --- Poonam Gill

We report a series of experiments investigating the influence of feeling
lucky or unlucky on people's choice of known-risk or ambiguous options
state of feeling lucky or unlucky in subjects by using a rigged
wheel-of-fortune game, which just missed either the bankrupt or the
jackpot outcome. In the first experiment a large reversal of the usual
ambiguity aversion effect was shown, indicating that feeling lucky made
subjects significantly more ambiguity seeking than usual.
However, this effect failed to replicate in five refined and larger
follow-up experiments. Thus we conclude that there is no evidence that
feeling lucky reliably influences ambiguity aversion. Men were less
ambiguity averse than women when there were potential gains to be had,
but there were no gender differences when the task was negatively
framed in terms of losses.

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## Effects of induced moods on economic choices --- Steven J. Stanton --- Crystal Reeck --- Scott A. Huettel --- Kevin S. LaBar

Emotions can shape decision processes by altering valuation signals,
risk perception, and strategic orientation. Although multiple
theories posit a role for affective processes in mediating the
influence of frames on decision making, empirical studies have yet
to demonstrate that manipulated affect modulates framing
phenomena. The present study asked whether induced affective states
alter gambling propensity and the influence of frames on decision
making. In a between-subjects design, we induced mood (happy, sad,
or neutral) in subjects (N=91) via films that were interleaved with
the framing task. Happy mood induction increased gambling and
apparently accentuated framing effects compared to sad mood
induction, although the effect on framing could have resulted from
the fact that the increased tendency to gamble made the framing
measure more sensitive. Happy mood induction increased gambling, but
not framing magnitude, compared to neutral mood induction. Subjects
experiencing a sad mood induction did not exhibit behavioral
differences from those experiencing a neutral mood. For those
subjects who experienced the happy mood induction, both gambling
propensity and framing magnitude were positively correlated with the
magnitude of the change in their mood valence. We discuss the
broader implications of mood effects on real-world economic
decisions.
% changes in abstract

2014/03/28 - 20:32
• ## Lay understanding of probability distributions --- Daniel G. Goldstein --- David Rothschild

How accurate are laypeople's intuitions about probability distributions
of events? The economic and psychological literatures provide opposing
answers. A classical economic view assumes that ordinary decision
makers consult perfect expectations, while recent psychological
research has emphasized biases in perceptions. In this work, we test
laypeople's intuitions about probability distributions. To establish a
ground truth against which accuracy can be assessed, we control the
information seen by each subject to establish
unambiguous normative answers. We find that laypeople's statistical
intuitions can be highly accurate, and depend strongly upon the
elicitation method used. In particular, we find that eliciting an
entire distribution from a respondent using a graphical interface, and
then computing simple statistics (such as means, fractiles, and
confidence intervals) on this distribution, leads to greater accuracy,
on both the individual and aggregate level, than the standard method of
% changes here

2014/01/25 - 07:03
• ## Predicting biases in very highly educated samples: Numeracy and metacognition --- Saima Ghazal --- Edward T. Cokely --- Rocio Garcia-Retamero

We investigated the relations between numeracy and superior judgment and
decision making in two large community outreach studies in Holland
(n=5408). In these very highly educated samples (e.g., 30--50%
held graduate degrees), the Berlin Numeracy Test was a robust predictor
of financial, medical, and metacognitive task performance (i.e.,
lotteries, intertemporal choice, denominator neglect, and confidence
judgments), independent of education, gender, age, and another numeracy
assessment. Metacognitive processes partially mediated the link between
numeracy and superior performance. More numerate participants performed
better because they deliberated more during decision making and more
accurately evaluated their judgments (e.g., less overconfidence).
Results suggest that well-designed numeracy tests tend to be robust
predictors of superior judgment and decision making because they
simultaneously assess (1) mathematical competency and (2) metacognitive
and self-regulated learning skills.

2014/01/25 - 07:03
• ## Cognitive integration of recognition information and additional cues in memory-based decisions --- Andreas Glockner --- Arndt Broder

Gloeckner and Broeder (2011) have shown that for 77.5% of their participants'
decision making behavior in decisions involving recognition information and
explicitly provided additional cues could be better described by
weighted-compensatory Parallel Constraint Satisfaction (PCS) Models than by
non-compensatory strategies such as recognition heuristic (RH) or Take the Best
(TTB). We investigate whether this predominance of PCS models also holds in
memory-based decisions in which information retrieval is effortful and
cognitively demanding. Decision strategies were analyzed using a
maximum-likelihood strategy classification method, taking into account choices,
response times and confidence ratings simultaneously. In contrast to the
memory-based-RH hypothesis, results show that also in memory-based decisions
for 62% of the participants behavior is best explained by a compensatory PCS
model. There is, however, a slight increase in participants classified as users
of the non-compensatory strategies RH and TTB (32%) compared to the previous
study, mirroring other studies suggesting effects of costly retrieval.

2014/01/25 - 07:03
• ## On the role of recognition in consumer choice: A model comparison --- Benjamin E. Hilbig

One prominent model in the realm of memory-based judgments and decisions is the
recognition heuristic. Under certain preconditions, it presumes that choices
are based on recognition in a one-cue non-compensatory manner and that other
information is ignored. This claim has been studied widely---and received, at
best, mixed support---in probabilistic inferences. By contrast, only a small
number of recent investigations have taken the RH to the realm of preferential
decisions (i.e. consumer choice). So far, the conclusion has been that the RH
cannot satisfactorily account for aggregate data patterns, but no fully
specified alternative model has been demonstrated to provide a better account.
Herein, the data from a recent consumer-choice study (Thoma & Williams, 2013)
are re-analyzed with the outcome-based maximum-likelihood strategy
classification method, thus testing several competing models on individual
data. Results revealed that an alternative compensatory model (an equal weights
strategy) accounted best for a larger number of datasets than the RH. Thereby,
the findings further specify prior results and answer the call for comparative
model testing on individual data that has been voiced repeatedly.

2014/01/25 - 07:03
• ## Self-reported ethical risk taking tendencies predict actual dishonesty --- Liora Zimerman --- Shaul Shalvi --- Yoella Bereby-Meyer

Are people honest about the extent to which they engage in unethical
behaviors? We report an experiment examining the relation between
self-reported risky unethical tendencies and actual dishonest
behavior. Participants' self-reported risk taking tendencies were
assessed using the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT)
questionnaire, while actual self-serving dishonesty was assessed
predicted the outcome of coin tosses, held the predictions in mind,
and reported whether their predictions were correct. Thus, the task
allowed participants to lie about whether their predictions were
correct. We manipulated whether reporting higher correct scores
increased (vs. not) participants monetary payoff. Results revealed
a positive relation between self-reported unethical risky tendencies
and actual dishonesty. The effect was limited to the condition in
which dishonesty was self-serving. Our results suggest liars are
aware of their dishonest tendencies and are potentially not ashamed
of them.
% changes

2014/01/25 - 07:03
• ## Cultural differences in responses to real-life and hypothetical trolley problems --- Natalie Gold --- Andrew M. Colman --- Briony D. Pulford

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the
psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has
focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral
intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However,
cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral
judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory,
with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and
Chinese samples on moral behavior and judgment. We found that Chinese
participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and
less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using
three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by
an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to
take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was
more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death.

2014/01/25 - 07:03
• ## Does menu design influence retirement investment choices? Evidence from Italian occupational pension funds --- Andrea Lippi

Previous research has demonstrated that consumers' decisions
regarding supplementary pensions could be affected by biases.
Bernatzi and Thaler's experiment demonstrated that menu design can
influence pension fund enrollment decisions, in that participants
appear to adopt a na\"ive heuristic, i.e., extremeness aversion''.
Using a database of 27 occupational pension funds from 2007 to 2011,
design affected Italian workers' choices regarding the supplementary
pension system as a result of the new rules enacted by the regulator
in 2007. Most enrolled workers opted for the median investment
line. I discuss the possible relevance of this result to public
policy, in particular the possibility of including these preferences
in the regulations, with the aim of benefiting employees.
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2014/01/25 - 07:03