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Kosmos
Astronomia Astrofizyka
Inne

Kultura
Sztuka dawna i współczesna, muzea i kolekcje

Metoda
Metodologia nauk, Matematyka, Filozofia, Miary i wagi, Pomiary

Materia
Substancje, reakcje, energia
Fizyka, chemia i inżynieria materiałowa

Człowiek
Antropologia kulturowa Socjologia Psychologia Zdrowie i medycyna

Wizje
Przewidywania Kosmologia Religie Ideologia Polityka

Ziemia
Geologia, geofizyka, geochemia, środowisko przyrodnicze

Życie
Biologia, biologia molekularna i genetyka

Cyberprzestrzeń
Technologia cyberprzestrzeni, cyberkultura, media i komunikacja

Działalność
Wiadomości | Gospodarka, biznes, zarządzanie, ekonomia

Technologie
Budownictwo, energetyka, transport, wytwarzanie, technologie informacyjne

Informal Logic

Book Review Emotive Language in Argumentation by Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton New York: Cambridge UP. 9781107676657 (pbk.). Review by MICHAEL A. GILBERT Department of Philosophy York University 4700 Keele St, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3 gilbert@yorku.ca

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4206 2014/09/22 - 22:34

This paper examines arguments that take counter- considerations into account, and it does so from a dialogical point of view. According to my account, a counterconsideration is part of a critical reaction from a real or imagined opponent, and an arguer may take it into account in his argument in at least six fully responsive ways. Conductive arguments (or: pro and con arguments, balance of con-siderations arguments) will be characterized as one of these types. In this manner, the paper aims to show how conducive, and related kinds of argument can be understood dialogically.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4055 2014/09/22 - 22:34

This paper applies dialectical argumentation structures to the problem of analyzing the ad baculum fallacy. It is shown how it is necessary in order to evaluate a suspected instance of the this fallacy to proceed through three levels of analysis: (1) an inferential level, represented by an argument diagram, (2) a speech act level, where conditions for specific types of speech acts are defined and applied, and (3) a dialectical level where the first two levels are linked together and fitted into formal dialogue structures. The paper adds a new type of dialogue called advising dialogue that needs to be applied at the third level.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4109 2014/09/22 - 22:34

a recent paper, Fábio Perin Shecaira (2013) proposes a defence of Waller’s deductivist schema for moral analogical argumentation. This defence has several flaws, the most important of them being that many good analogical arguments would be deemed bad or deficient. Additionally, Shecaira misrepresents my alternative account as something in between deductivism and non-deductivism. This paper is both an attempt at solving this misunderstanding and an analysis and criticism of Waller and Shecaira’s forms of deductivism.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4112 2014/09/22 - 22:34

In this paper, I argue that many arguments from expert opinion are strong arguments. Therefore, in many cases it is rational to rely on experts since in many cases the fact that an expert says that p makes it highly likely that p is true. I will defend this claim by providing 5 arguments that illuminate and elaborate on 5 crucial claims about expertise. In this way, I aim to undermine recent attempts to establish a rampant scepticism about arguments from expert opinion.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3886 2014/06/04 - 09:14

I consider some uses of citations in academic writing and analyze them as instances of the “appeal to expert opinion” argumentative scheme to show that the critical questions commonly linked to this scheme are difficult to apply. I argue that, by considering citations as special communicative and argumentative situated acts, their use in real practice can be explained more adequately. Adaptation to the audience and to the social constraints is common and necessary in order to collaborate with others and to advance in a discipline, but also to attain rhetorical goals that differ from strictly cognitive ones.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3649 2014/06/04 - 09:14

Taking Blair’s recent contribution to the debate about the triad as its starting point, the article discusses and challenges attempts to reduce the intricate relationship between rhetoric, dialectic and logic to a trichotomy with watertight compartments or to separate them with a single clear-cut criterion. I argue that efforts to pinpoint an essential difference, among the various typical differences partly grounded in disciplinary traditions, obscure the complexities within the fields. As a consequence, crosscutting properties of the fields as well as the possibilities for theoretical bridging between them are neglected.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4062 2014/06/04 - 09:14

By Maurice A. Finocchiaro Studies in Logic, Logic and Argumentation, Vol. 42. London: College Publications, 2013. Pp. vii, 1-279. ISBN 978-1-84890-097-4. UK£12 US$17.10 CDN$21.12

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4165 2014/06/04 - 09:14

The paper reports on a Socratic exercise that introduces participants to the norm of rational entitlement, as distinct from political entitlement, and the attendant norm of rational responsibility. The exercise demonstrates that, because participants are not willing to exchange their own opinion at random for another differing opinion to which the owner is, by the participants’ own admission, entitled, they treat their entitlement to their own opinion differently, giving it a special status. This gives rise to rational obligations such as the obligation to provide reasons, and a willingness to risk those opinions to the force of the better reason.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3882 2014/03/01 - 01:20

Introduction by Christopher W. Tindale Argumentation Library, Volume 21. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012. Pp. xxi, 1-355. Hardcover US$149. Softcover US$24.95.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4120 2014/03/01 - 01:20

Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3938 2014/03/01 - 01:20

In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3899 2014/03/01 - 01:20

In his youth, John Stuart Mill followed his father’s philosophy of persuasion but, in 1830, Mill adopted a new philosophy of persuasion, trying to lead people incrementally towards the truth from their original stand-points rather than engage them antagonistically. Understanding this change helps us understand apparent contradictions in Mill’s cannon, as he disguises some of his more radical ideas in order to bring his audience to re-assess and authentically change their opinions. It also suggests a way of re-assessing the relationship between Mill’s public and private works, to which we should look if we are attempting to understand his thought.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3869 2014/03/01 - 01:20

The public must make assessments of a range of health-related issues. However, these assessments require scientific know-ledge which is often lacking or ineffectively utilized by the public. Lay people must use whatever cognitive resources are at their disposal to come to judgement on these issues. It will be contended that a group of arguments—so-called informal fallacies—are a valuable cognitive resource in this regard. These arguments serve as cognitive heuristics which facilitate reasoning when knowledge is limited or beyond the grasp of reasoners. The results of an investigation into the use of these arguments by the public are reported.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3801 2014/03/01 - 01:20

Many French-speaking approaches to argumentation are deeply rooted in a linguistic background. Hence, they “naturally” tend to adopt a descriptive stance on argumentation. This is why the issue of “the virtues of argumentation”—and, specifically, the question of what makes an argument virtuous—is not central to them. The argumentative norms issue nevertheless can-not be discarded, as it obviously is crucial to arguers themselves: the latter often behave as if they were invested with some kind of argumentative policing duty when involved in dissensual exchanges. We describe several researches developing a descriptive approach to such ordinary argumentative policing: we claim that the virtues of argumentation may be an issue even for an amoral analyst. We will connect this issue with linguistic remarks on the lexicon of refutation in English and in French.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4078 2013/12/03 - 21:29

Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion of an argument that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4077 2013/12/03 - 21:29

From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in skeptical discussions concerning knowledge of the existence, state, and standing of other minds. The analogical move from self to other unfolds as controversy. This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation predicament and examines analogy as an opening to the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition is identified as a productive process coming to terms with an other through testing sustainable risk. The paper explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized by Aristotle’s virtue ethics in the polis. Moral hazard is identified as a threat to modern argument communities.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4079 2013/12/03 - 21:29

This paper provides a preliminary account of fallacies on Toulmin’s model of argument, one that improves upon previous attempts to understand fallacies on this argument scheme. To do this Johnson and Blair’s (1983) taxonomy of three basic fallacies (irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion and problematic premise) is examined using Toulmin’s layout.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3900 2013/12/03 - 21:29

by Mark Weinstein King’s College London, UK: College Publications, 2013. Pp. viii, 1-232. Softcover. ISBN-13: 978-1-84890-100-1, ISBN-10: 1848901003. US$ 17.00

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4021 2013/09/14 - 01:17

Edited by J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson King’s College London, UK: College Publications, 2011. Pp. vii, 1-299. Softcover. ISBN: 978-1-84890-030-1. US$ ~20

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/4019 2013/09/14 - 01:17

The paper provides a qualified defence of Bruce Waller’s deductivist schema for a priori analogical arguments in ethics and law. One crucial qualification is that the schema represents analogical arguments as complexes composed of one deductive inference (hence “deductivism”) but also of one non-deductive subargument. Another important qualification is that the schema is informed by normative assumptions regarding the conditions that an analogical argument must satisfy in order for it to count as an optimal instance of its kind. Waller’s schema (in qualified form) is defended from criticisms formulated by Trudy Govier, Marcello Guarini and Lilian Bermejo-Luque.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3778 2013/09/14 - 01:17

The Collegiate Learning Assessment Test (CLA) has become popular and highly recommended, praised for its reliability and validity. I argue that while the CLA may be a commendable test for measuring critical-thinking, problem-solving, and logical-reasoning skills, those who are scoring students’ answers to the test’s questions are rendering the CLA invalid.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3774 2013/09/14 - 01:17

The implicit dimension of enthymemes is investigated from a pragmatic perspective to show why a premise can be left unexpressed, and how it can be used strategically. The relationship between the implicit act of taking for granted and the pattern of presumptive reasoning is shown to be the cornerstone of kairos and the fallacy of straw man. By taking a proposition for granted, the speaker shifts the burden of proving its un-acceptability onto the hearer. The resemblance (likeliness) of the tacit premise with what is commonly acceptable or has been actually stated can be used as a rhetorical strategy.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3679 2013/09/14 - 01:17

The inventive, argumentative and stylistic possibilities generated by figures in general and the figure antithesis in particular are explored by Jeanne Fahnestock in the field of science. These ideas on the possibilities of antithesis are developed in the analysis of some cases of this figure in the media. This paper explores how antithesis can consist of textual and visual elements, and how various sorts and degrees of opposition are constructed in the figure.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3758 2013/09/14 - 01:17

In this paper I review a number of Govier’s criticisms of the standard view of logic at the time she was developing her views about the nature of logic as it applies to the critique of arguments in natural language and the development of ways to teach skills in such critique. I argue that the concept of informal logic has emerged at least in part from those criticisms and Govier’s positive alternatives.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3889 2013/05/31 - 21:29

The Editors thank Ken Peacock for his assistance.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3898 2013/05/31 - 21:29

Epistemology and informal logic have overlapping and broadly similar subject matters. A principle of methodological symmetry is: philosophical theories of sufficiently similar subject matters should engage similar methods. Suppose the best way to do epistemology is in highly formalized ways, with a large role for mathematical methods. The symmetry principle suggests this is also the best way to do the logic of the reasoning and argument, the subject matter of informal logic. A capitulation to mathematics is inimical to informal logicians, yet formal methods and mathematical models are an emerging force in epistemology. What is to be done? What’s sauce for the goose of epistemology is sauce for the gander of informal logic.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3897 2013/05/31 - 21:29

This paper attempts two things: (a) to give the reader a very general idea of the main outlines of what Govier has to say both about social and political trust and about trust in personal relationships, and (b) to present in slightly more detail what she says about the role of trust in acquiring belief and/or knowledge from testimony and about the reasons for trusting such testimony.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3896 2013/05/31 - 21:29

Trudy Govier argues in The Philosophy of Argument that adversariality in argumentation can be kept to a necessary minimum. On her ac-count, politeness can limit the ancillary adversariality of hostile culture but a degree of logical opposition will remain part of argumentation, and perhaps all reasoning. Argumentation cannot be purified by politeness in the way she hopes, nor does reasoning even in the discursive context of argumentation demand opposition. Such hopes assume an idealized politeness free from gender, and reasoners with inhuman or at least highly privileged capabilities and no need to learn from others or share understanding.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3895 2013/05/31 - 21:29

Wellman’s “conduction” and Govier’s “conductive arguments” are best described as appeals to considerations. The considerations cited are features of a subject of interest, and the conclusion is the attribution to it of a supervenient status like a classification, an evaluation, a prescription or an interpretation. The conclusion may follow either conclusively or non-conclusively or not at all. Weighing the pros and cons is only one way of judging whether the conclusion follows. Further, the move from in-formation about the subject’s cited features to the attribution of a supervenient status is often but one moment in a more complex process.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3894 2013/05/31 - 21:29

In a priori analogies, the analogue is constructed in imagination, sharing certain properties with the primary subject. The analogue has some further property clearly consequent on those shared properties. Ceteris paribus the primary subject has that property also. The warrant involves non-empirical, e.g., moral intuition but is also defeasible. The argument is thus neither deductive nor inductive, but an additional type. In an inductive analogy, the analogues back the warrant from below. Distinguishing these two types of arguments by analogy gives epistemic evaluative factors primacy over resemblance factors in classifying arguments—a prescient insight on Govier’s part.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3893 2013/05/31 - 21:29

This is a critical appreciation of Govier’s 2006 ISSA keynote address on the fallacy of composition, and of economists’ writings on this fallacy in economics. I argue that the “fallacy of composition” is a problematical concept, because it does not denote a distinctive kind of argument but rather a plurality, and does not constitute a distinctive kind of error, but rather reduces to oversimplification in arguing from micro to macro. Finally, I propose further testing of this claim based on examples involving public vs. private debt in economics; oligarchic tendencies in politics, and the emergence of societal wholes in sociology.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3892 2013/05/31 - 21:29

My main concern in this paper is with Trudy Govier’s acceptability criterion for the adequacy of the premises of an argument considered independently of whether they are “properly connected” to the conclusion. I consider arguments she makes against the view that a good argument must have true premises, and I con-tend that a theory of argument could hold both that for an argument to be a good argument its premises must be true and that for it to be a good argument relative to its audience, the audience must be epistemically justified in accepting its premises as true.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3891 2013/05/31 - 21:29

In this paper, I propose that the inquiry known as a/the theory of argument is the “invention” of Trudy Govier, using that term in its rhetorical sense, viz., the process of choosing ideas appropriate to the subject. In her (1987) paper, “Is a Theory of Argument Possible?” Govier used the idea of theory of argument to focus her discussion on problems in argument analysis and evaluation that came to light in the 1970s and 1980s. The idea of a theory of argument was already there but Govier “discovered” it in the sense that she made its potential clear.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3890 2013/05/31 - 21:29

The Editors express their gratitude and appreciation to the indi-viduals listed below who served as referees for Informal Logic for Volumes 31 (2011) and 32 (2012).

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3864 2013/03/16 - 20:04

In this paper, I argue that arguments from expert opinion, i.e., inferences from “Expert E says that p” to “p,” where the truth value of p is unknown, are weak arguments. A weak argument is an argument in which the premises, even if true, provide weak support—or no support at all—for the conclusion. Such arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments unless the fact that an expert says that p makes p significantly more likely to be true. However, research on expertise shows that expert opinions are only slightly more accurate than chance and much less accurate than decision procedures. If this is correct, then it follows that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3656 2013/03/16 - 20:04

Both the traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic approaches to logic have seen logic in terms of discrete symbol processing. Yet there are several kinds of argument whose validity depends on some topological notion of continuous variation, which is not well captured by discrete symbols. Examples include extrapolation and slippery slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, and those involving closeness of possible worlds. It is argued that the natural first attempts to analyze these notions and explain their relation to reasoning fail, so that ignorance of their nature is profound.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3610 2013/03/16 - 20:04

In this paper we consider the prospects for an account of good argument that takes the character of the arguer into consideration. We conclude that although there is much to be gained by identifying the virtues of the good arguer and by considering the ways in which these virtues can be developed in ourselves and in others, virtue argumentation theory does not offer a plausible alternative definition of good argument.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3608 2013/03/16 - 20:04

The lack of a theory of relevance in the current state of the art of informal logic has often been considered regrettable, a gap that must be filled before the Relevance-Sufficiency-Acceptability model can be considered complete. I wish to challenge this view. A theory of relevance is neither desirable nor possible. Informal logic can get by perfectly well, and has been doing so far, with relevance judgments that are by nature unanalysable and intuitive. Criticism of theories of relevance, for example in Woods (1992), is deflated.

http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/3493 2013/03/16 - 20:04